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Abstract—Cloud computing provides a wide range of services
to organisations in a flexible and cost efficient manner. Neverthe-
less, inherent cloud security issues make organisations hesitant
towards the migration of their services to cloud. In parallel,
the cloud service-oriented nature requires a specific and more
demanding description of the business functional requirements
intended for migration. Organisations need to transform their
functional requirements based on a specific language, taking
into account the respective non-functional requirements of the
migrating services. Thus, the need for an approach that will
holistically capture organisations’ security and privacy require-
ments and transform them to cloud service requirements is
immense. To this end, this paper presents an approach that
takes as input abstract security and privacy requirements and
produces through a semi-automatic process various alternative
implementation options for cloud services. To achieve that a
series of model transformations are utilised in order to create
a mapping between the organisational and the operational level
of the system’s analysis.
Keywords—Security, Privacy, Cloud Computing, Semi-
automatic Process, Business Process Modelling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a paradigm where computing resources
owned by third party providers are offered as a self-serviceable
commodity through the concept of a utility model, accessible
through network connections. We derive our definitions of a
cloud computing service around the common cloud attributes
provided by NIST [12], as well as the ones described in the
extended related work. NIST describes the common character-
istics for cloud models as; on-demand self-service, ubiquitous
network access, rapid elasticity, location independent resource
pooling and measured service.
In order to understand and represent the user requirements
in terms of enabling organisational strategy to encompass
business needs and provide some offering to customers, we
need to be able to describe the context of the system. The
goals which an organisation aims to achieve by the execution
of its business processes can provide highly relevant input
during the system’s design phase. Goal-oriented requirements
engineering (GORE) approaches use goals to capture the
rationale behind design-time decisions. Therefore, when paired
with business process modelling approaches, they are a useful
initial tool for the design of an organisation’s processes [6].
In this work we focus on security and privacy oriented
aspects of GORE and business process modelling, as our
research is primary targeted at organisations seeking to un-
derstand the security and privacy impacts of cloud computing
on their processes. This typically involves the analysis and
transformation of one or more complex systems residing in
a business environment to a cloud computing environment.
Software systems represent a dynamic environment, where
the interaction between different technologies, the exchange of
data and the participating actors enable the delivery of business
offerings. However cloud computing presents several new se-
curity and privacy-related challenges as a result of the various
technologies involved, both in terms of traditional established
paradigms and the amalgamation of different methods for
delivering computing resources [4], [18].
This highlights the multiple layers of abstraction required to
understand the complexities in relationships and entities. Thus
we need to capture the users security and privacy requirements
within the context of their organisational environment. There
are many methodologies that can be applied to capture and rep-
resent these concepts, but we will focus on adapting a model-
driven security approach for eliciting security and privacy
requirements and representing, reasoning and addressing the
security and privacy issues and impacts on the users software
system in a cloud computing environment [21].
Due to the different language used to describe cloud-
based software systems at the various levels of abstraction
(i.e., organisational, operational, cloud level), a disconnect is
created between the high level strategy, the processes and
the description of the properties of the services used to
implement them. In the context of security and privacy, this
disconnect often results in deficient system designs with costly
implications for organisations, both financially and in terms of
customer trust [15].
Therefore, there is a need for a holistic approach, capable
of connecting the different levels of analysis, beginning from
highly-abstract organisational goals and leading up to cloud
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service requirements, creating a mapping between the different
levels of abstraction along the way.
To contribute towards that direction, this works aims to
answer the following questions:
1) Which concepts are required to capture cloud service
requirements?
2) How can we align cloud service level requirements with
high-level security and privacy organisational goals?
To achieve that, first we present a metamodel containing
interrelated concepts, capable of describing a system through
different levels of abstraction, and next, based on these
concepts we present a semi-automatic approach, aiming to
bridge the gap between organisational goals and cloud service
requirements, focusing on the context of security and privacy.
This approach begins from the elicitation of high level security
and privacy requirements and implementation mechanisms
from organisational goal models. Rules for transforming such
models to business processes containing security and privacy
constraint and implementing activities are provided next. Fi-
nally, using transformation rules for mapping operational level
elements to specific cloud service characteristics, cloud service
requirements are extracted from the system’s process models.
Therefore, organisations in need of designing or migrating
systems to the cloud can benefit from such an approach, as
it can provide guidance throughout the different levels of
abstraction in a semi-automated manner while also allows
security and privacy related reasoning.
The rest of this work is structured as follows; Section II in-
troduces our metamodel containing the concepts necessary for
describing the different levels of system analysis. Section III
briefly describes a real life system used for demonstrating the
different steps of the proposed approach which are introduced
in Section IV. Finally, related work is discussed in Section V
and conclusions and future work in Section VI.
II. CONCEPTS
In this section we outline the concepts required for speci-
fying cloud services aligned with the users high level security
and privacy requirements. In order to adequately capture the
different levels of abstraction required for the systems analysis,
a metamodel is introduced in Fig. 1 which combines concepts
representing different perspectives. The building blocks of this
metamodel are the following:
Goal-oriented requirements engineering concepts: As dis-
cussed earlier, GORE is an effective way of capturing high
level organisational strategy via the use of actors, goals,
resources and dependencies. Since this work focuses on the
aspects of security and privacy, we also need to be able to
include such concerns at the highest level of analysis. This
is why Secure Tropos [14], [13] concepts were selected, as
they allow us to perform security and privacy analysis from
an organisational perspective.
Business process modelling concepts: Business processes
are an effective tool for describing the participants and the flow
of activities and information within a system. BPMN 2.0 [16]
is the de facto standard business process modelling language,
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ABSTRACTION AND GRANULARITY FOR SERVICES
Service Business Service Cloud Computing Ser-vice
Users Users Cloud users
Service
provider Providers Service providers
Service
description Service description Service description
- Functionalities Capabilities
- Resources Resources
- Dependencies Dependencies
- - Service model
- - Deployment model
providing a plethora of concepts for capturing the operational
perspective of systems. Therefore, it will be used as a part of
this approach in order to capture the functional perspective of
system analysis.
Cloud service concepts: The description of cloud computing
services requires the introduction of a number of concepts able
to capture its unique characteristics. It is important that we
are able to describe cloud services at an appropriate level of
abstraction in order to accurately elicit both their functional
and security and privacy related requirements. Later in this
section we present a discussion regarding which aspects of
cloud services are required for our analysis and we define
concepts that allow us to perform it.
There are several factors to be considered for the creation
of the metamodel of Fig. 1. The main challenge is to identify
which concepts are required in order to capture the necessary
information at each level of the analysis. Additionally, another
aspect which needs to be considered is how concepts sourcing
from different levels of abstraction and granularity can be
interrelated in a meaningful way. To overcome such issues,
first we identified the relevant aspects of cloud services and
created their respective concepts. Next we created transforma-
tion rules that link these cloud service related concepts to the
business process level. Finally an additional set of rules was
introduced for linking the operational level process concepts to
the cloud computing level. Therefore, the transformation rules
dictated the concepts which needed to be included from each
abstraction level, as well as the relationships between them.
A. Cloud Service concepts
We begin by defining services based on different levels of
abstraction and granularity as shown in Tab. I, which we argue
is required for capturing and reasoning about security and
privacy aspects of cloud computing.
Service: The general perception of a service is something
of value offered by someone to someone else. For instance, a
company offers online shopping as a service to end users. At
the abstract level, a service includes at least one category of
users, a service provider and a service description. However,
we need to provide a more precise definition of what a service
is in the context of cloud computing, in order to reason about
its security and privacy aspects.
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Fig. 1. Metamodel of the proposed approach
Business Service: At a highly abstract business level,
services are something of value that is offered to customers.
To provide a fine-grained definition of a business service,
we provide the following attributes: A description of what
the service offers, one or many functionalities, one or many
users, one or many providers, one or many resources and one
or many dependencies.
Cloud Computing Service: In order to capture cloud
computing services, we use the concepts of a business
service and extend them through cloud-specific notions,
notably the service model and deployment model attributes.
Thus we define a cloud computing service as follows:
a cloud service has a description of what it offers, one
or many capabilities, one or many cloud users, one or
many service providers, one or many resources, one or
many dependencies, a service model and a deployment
model. We specify the service and deployment models
in order to account for service relationships on the cloud
level, i.e. different components which will be managed
and physically stored by different providers and reside in
varied geographical premises dependent on specified models.
Cloud services are delivered through three service models;
Software-as-a-Service(SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service(PaaS) and
Infrastructure-as-a-Service(IaaS), which can be conceptualised
as layers built on top of each other. The deployment model
determines the user group, the level of access and the
exposure of the cloud service. It also indicates the physical
location, ownership and management responsibilities of the
computing resources. We capture four deployment levels
based on the NIST cloud computing definition; Public,
Private, Community and Hybrid.
III. CASE STUDY
This section presents the University of the Aegean Career
Office, an existing system, part of which will be used as a case
study for the application of our method. The main objective of
the University of the Aegean Career Office system is boundary
management, i.e. helping students to manage the choices and
transitions they need to make upon completing their studies, in
order to proceed effectively to the next step of their careers [9].
For the purposes of our example, and due to space limitations
of the current work, we will model only a partial view of the
system’s organisational goals, the conduction of a survey of the
university’s graduates, performed in order for the university to
maintain communication with its graduates. The Career Office
creates the survey and outsources its hosting and the gathering
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of responses to a cloud service provider. Once the results are
collected, they are send back to the Career Office in order
to be analysed and be made available to the graduates for
discussion. A number of security and privacy issues can be
identified when designing such a system, however in order to
illustrate a relatively simple example of the application of our
approach we will limit our analysis to one security and one
privacy constraint at the cloud service provider level.
The context of the Career Office system is fitting with the
security and privacy oriented nature of the proposed approach.
Nevertheless, since our approach uses elements from two
modelling languages (i.e., Secure Tropos and BPMN 2.0)
which are flexible and expressive, it is generic enough to be
able to support the security and privacy analysis of any system
operating in a cloud environment, regardless of the specifics
of its context.
IV. APPROACH
In this section the steps of the proposed approach for
eliciting cloud service requirements will be introduced. An
overview of the steps of the proposed approach, along with
their main inputs and outputs is presented in Fig. 2. Next,
each step is individually presented and applied to the Career
Office system.
Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed approach
Step 1. Elicitation of Organisational Security and Pri-
vacy Requirements. The first step aims to create a goal
model of the system to-be by taking into account the overall
organisational strategy and the input of system stakeholders.
This goal model, consisting of actors, goals, resources and
dependencies, will be the main artefact for the identification
of the system’s security and privacy requirements. For the
elicitation of such requirements we use the Secure Tropos
approach [14], [13]. Through the concepts of constraints,
objectives and mechanisms, offered by the Secure Tropos
approach, security and privacy requirements and potential
implementation techniques can be captured and linked with the
various elements of the goal model. The input of organisational
stakeholders and security experts is essential for this step.
In the context of the system selected for our case study,
the security and privacy oriented goal model is presented at
Fig. 3 where three actors are identified (i.e., Careers office
system, Cloud service provider, University graduates). The
high level goal of each actor (e.g., “Conduct graduate survey”
for the Career office system) is further decomposed to sub-
goals (e.g., “Create survey”, “Analyse responses” etc.), which
can also be decomposed to simpler and less abstract plans
(e.g., “Identify survey questions”). Certain actors depend on
each other for the achievement of some of their goals (e.g.,
University graduates depend on the Career Office system
for their goal “Participate in graduate survey”), which is
captured at the goal model using a dependency relationship.
A security constraint regarding the access of the survey form
only from the university graduates is identified by the system
stakeholders. The identified constraint is connected with the
authorisation security requirement, which can be implemented
using a number of techniques. In this case candidate security
implementation techniques have been identified by security
experts as either the use of user credentials (i.e., username and
password) or by a user whitelist. Similarly, regarding privacy,
a constraint identified dictates that the survey responses cannot
be matched to a specific user, which relates to the unlinkability
privacy requirement and can be implemented by using various
communication protocols (i.e., GAP, TOR) for establishing a
private channel between the user and the cloud service.
Step 2. Transformation to Hybrid Reference Process
Model. The transformation of the derived goal model to a
hybrid reference process model aims to map organisational
level security and privacy concerns to operational level activi-
ties. Additionally, it captures all the different combinations of
possible security and privacy configurations introduced at the
goal model level, thus allowing a number of different security
and privacy mechanisms to be instantiated when the final
business process design is created. Another contribution of this
goal-to-process mapping is the adaptability of the produced
process designs, as changes at the security requirements of
an organisation can, via the hybrid reference model, be traced
and reflected to specific parts of its processes and vice versa.
TABLE II
STEPS FOR THE GOAL-TO-HYBRID REFERENCE PROCESS MODEL
TRANSFORMATION
Phase 1 ∀ac (actor) of the goal model:∃l(ac) (lane) in the hybrid model.
Phase 2 ∀(g||p) (leaf-level goal or plan) of the goal model:∃(a(g)||a(p)) (activity) in the hybrid model.
Phase 3 ∀r (resource) of the goal model:∃(d(r)||ds(r)) (data object or data store) in the hybrid
model.
Phase 4
∀c (constraint), ∀o (objective) and ∀m (mechanism) con-
nected to a goal (g), plan (p) or resource (r) of the goal
model:
Transfer it to the hybrid model.
Connect it to the corresponding activities (a(g)||a(p)) or
data objects (d(r)||ds(r)).
The produced hybrid model includes BPMN 2.0 [16] pro-
cess elements transformed from Secure Tropos [14] concepts,
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Fig. 3. Partial view of the security and privacy oriented goal model of the Career Office System
Fig. 4. Hybrid reference process model of the Career Office System
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following the transformation rules of Table II, originally
introduced in [1]. The security-oriented concepts (constraints,
objectives, mechanisms) of the goal model sourcing from
Secure Tropos, are directly transferred at the hybrid model,
maintaining their connections with the corresponding activities
and data objects. The hybrid model of the Career office system,
derived by transforming the goal model of Fig. 3 following the
above rules, is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Step 3. Process Design Instantiation. In this step, the
hybrid model is used to instantiate different secure business
process models. The alternatives, in terms of potential security
and privacy configurations introduced at the goal model level,
create variation points in the hybrid reference model. For each
security or privacy constraint activity or resource, different
combinations of implementation mechanisms can be selected,
according to the specific needs of each process instance.
For the operationalisation of such mechanisms we follow a
general pattern, introduced in Fig. 5. Using such a pattern,
we can automatically interject the operationalisation of the
selected security and privacy mechanisms before the constraint
activities are performed. When necessary, activities are added
at the user and system lane, representing their interaction
with the security or privacy implementing activity via the
exchange of messages. In order to differentiate the security and
privacy related activities at the process level a set of marked
padlock symbols are introduced where activities implementing
or interacting with mechanisms are marked with an “S”
padlock for security and “P” padlock for privacy. Similarly,
security constraint activities are denoted with a solid black
border while privacy constraint ones are marked with a dashed
black border.
Fig. 5. Process pattern for the operationalisation of security and privacy
In the context of our case study, the produced process model
is illustrated in Fig. 6. For its instantiation the security mech-
anism of “User credentials” and the privacy mechanism of
“TOR” have been selected and the appropriate security and pri-
vacy implementing activities along with the necessary message
exchanges have been introduced at the process model. The
creation of control flows has also been manually performed
by ordering and connecting the activities and introducing start
and end events. It is worth noting that a number of similar but
slightly different process models designs could be produced
from the hybrid model of Fig. 4, sourcing from a selection
of a different set of implementation mechanisms (e.g., “User
whitelist” and “GAP”) but due to space limitations Fig. 6
presents only one of such possible outcomes.
Step 4. Definition of Business Service Requirements.
In order to take advantage of cloud computing offerings, we
require well-defined descriptions of the business processes,
the user’s security and privacy requirements and a strategy
for bridging the gap between abstract business goals and
cloud service enactments in a cloud environment. In this step
we apply the business service template on the process model,
in order to generate a list of candidate business services.
The template describes the essential characteristics required
to capture business activities from a fine-grained perspective,
which produces a mapping from the business context to cloud
realisation through well-defined service requirements.
We describe each attribute of the business service template
and its transformation from the process model in Table III,
using an instance generated from the Career Office system as
an example. Due to limited space we only show one example
of an instantiation, illustrated in Fig. 7, but it is assumed that
a complete list of instances has been generated by following
the same process.
We define a set of semi-formal rules shown in Table IV,
facilitating the transformation of the process model produced
in Step 3 to business service instances. Some attributes offer
a range of options, user input is therefore required to generate
scenarios according to specific needs.
Fig. 7 shows the instantiation of the “Check Validity of User
Credentials” activity, where the user selects the IaaS Service
Model and Public as the Deployment Model. This implies at
an abstract level that the cloud user will be responsible for
managing the activities in all three conceptual layers, where
the cloud service provider is only responsible for providing
the physical infrastructure. The public model indicates multi-
tenancy, meaning that the infrastructure provisioned by the
cloud user may also be shared with other tenants.
Step 5. Definition of Cloud Service Requirements. In
this step we reason about the need to holistically capture
cloud environments, introducing the concepts necessary for
the analysis of requirements of cloud systems. Next, using
instances of the business service template, generated from the
Career Office system, we apply the cloud service requirements
model to produce cloud service requirements.
Cloud computing services are abstract notions which require
actors, software applications and hardware infrastructure to
fully realise. Thus we present the concept of a three layer
model to capture the social, application and infrastructure
components of a cloud computing environment. This allows us
to reason about the interactions between the service and the
underlying infrastructure, which is essential for representing
and addressing cloud security and privacy requirements. Here
we define the concepts required to create a three layer model
of a cloud computing environment.
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Fig. 6. Business process model of the conduction of an online survey
Fig. 7. Business Service Specification for “Check Validity of User Creden-
tials”
Social Concepts: Based on our definition of a service, a
cloud service is provided by a person or organisation. The
user of a cloud service is an actor representing a person or or-
ganisation, who requires computing resources realised through
abstraction of virtual and physical resources i.e. Virtual Re-
sources or Physical Nodes provided by actors known as cloud
service providers. Therefore we define a conceptual layer to
capture all interactions between the users and providers of
cloud services, using the concept of dependencies where an
actor depends on another actor for the delivery of a cloud
service. By building a complete view of inter-relationships
between users, cloud services and cloud service providers,
we are able to identify the accessibility and dependencies of
different cloud services between user groups. For example we
may generate a scenario where a user group without sufficient
access privileges has access to an unauthorised cloud service
which modifies confidential company data, in which case the
developer is able to amend access controls for the privacy-
constrained cloud service. Application Concepts: This view
abstractly represents the operational view of business pro-
cesses from the cloud computing perspective, where the con-
text and provision of cloud services are supported through the
upper and lower layers respectively. Our definition of a cloud
service includes properties required to describe some form of
offering which is enabled through computing resources. Thus,
each cloud service provides a description of its offerings, one
or many capabilities, cloud users, service providers, resources,
a service model and a development model. A capability is a
technical implementation of the ability to perform an action,
which from an abstract point of view describes the main
goal achieved by the action (e.g., “Implement access control
mechanism”).
Infrastructure Concepts: The cloud infrastructure forms
the foundation, enabling the delivery of cloud computing
resources to customers. The physical resources enabling cloud
computing services are abstractly decomposed as processing,
networking and storing resources on the infrastructure layer,
where we model from an abstract perspective, the residency
of virtual resources on physical storage. Notions for crucial
security and privacy properties such as confidentiality and
integrity of assets are captured through these attributes, for
example by associating ownership to specific groups of actors
or specifying the actors responsible for asset residency. By
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TABLE III
ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUSINESS SERVICE TEMPLATE.
Activity
Descrip-
tion
This attribute summarises the purpose of the service, which
is pulled from the activity name during the transformation
(e.g., “Authentication service” or “Check Validity of User
Credentials”).
Function-
ality
Each activity is mapped to one function, which indicates
the performance of a specific action in order to realise the
service (e.g., “Check user request” or “Establish unlinkable
connection”). The function also indicates the security and
privacy properties associated with the service, in the form
of constraints placed on the service or implementation of
mechanisms by the service.
Actors
All actors involved in the operation of the service are captured
here, which typically involves the end-users, service users and
service providers (e.g., “University graduates”, “Career Office
system”, “CSP”). We indicate CSP as a generic cloud service
provider since knowledge of specific providers is not required
at the requirements level.
Depend-
encies
We capture the concept of a dependency relationship between
actors by providing a description of the dependency, the type
of dependency (i.e., input where the depender is implicitly the
service provider or output where the dependee is implicitly
the service provider), the actors involved in the relationship,
and the resource required. For example the dependency of
the virtual resource “Authentication credential request” from
the depender actor “CSP”, which is implicit due to the
output dependency type, to the dependee actor “University
graduates”. Another example for the input dependency type
can be seen from the dependence of the virtual resource
“Authentication credentials” from the implicit depender actor
“CSP” to the dependee actor “University graduates”.
Security
and
Privacy
Properties
The security and privacy needs of business services are de-
fined through constraint and security or privacy implementing
functionalities:
Security: The security needs can either be a security con-
straint on a function or the implementation of a security
mechanism by a function e.g. SI1 indicates that the service
“Check validity of user credentials” implements a security
mechanism of the same name as the primary functionality.
Privacy: Similarly for privacy needs, this can be in the form
of a privacy constraint on a function or the implementation
of a privacy mechanism e.g. PC1 indicates that the privacy
constraint “Collect user responses” is placed on the service of
the same name, indicating the constraint on its functionality.
Resources
The type of assets required for delivering the service is
specified in order to assign responsibility, map relationships
and determine components involved when realising services.
For example a required resource can be of type message or
document which would be transformed to a virtual resource,
or database which corresponds to a physical node e.g. the
resource R4 of type virtual resource “Request user credential
records” is required in the dependency D4.
Service
Model
This attribute represents the level of cloud service the business
service is deployed on i.e. SaaS, PaaS or IaaS. User input is
required in able to specify the service model they wish to
deploy, therefore creating different service model scenarios.
Deploy-
ment
Model
Similarly the deployment model also presents a range of
options to the user, in this case a choice of public, private
or hybrid. This also generates different scenarios depending
on the model chosen, in addition to the chosen service model
i.e. a Public IaaS differs from a Private IaaS as ownership and
physical location of resources may be specified differently.
defining these concepts, we are able to model the propagation
of service interactions from the abstract social layer down to
a more fine-grained enactment of cloud services. Finally, we
can capture the consequences of service enactment in the cloud
environment.
TABLE IV
EXTRACTION OF BUSINESS SERVICES FROM PROCESS MODEL
Phase 1 Activity Description: ∀an (activity name) of the processmodel:
∃ad(an) (activity description) in the service template
Phase 2 Functionality: ∀ad (activity description) of the service tem-plate:
∃f(ad, sc||si||−, pc||pi||−) (functionality, security con-
straint or security implementation or null, privacy constraint
or privacy implementation or null) in the service template
Phase 3 Actors: ∀ac (actor) of the process model:∃ac(ac) (actor) in the service template
Phase 4 Dependencies: ∀d (dependency link) of the process model:∃d(i||o, ac(ac), r(r)) (input or output and resource) in the
service template
Phase 5
Security and Privacy Properties:
∀f(ad, sc,−), f(ad, si,−), f(ad,−, pc), f(ad,−, pi)
of the process model:
IF f(ad, sc,−) THEN ∃sc(sc, f) (security constraint) in
the service template
IF f(ad, si,−) THEN ∃si(si, f) (security implementa-
tion) in the service template
IF f(ad,−, pc) THEN ∃pc(pc, f) (privacy constraint) in
the service template
IF f(ad,−, pi) THEN ∃pi(pi, f) (privacy implementa-
tion) in the service template
Phase 6 Resources: ∀do, ∀ds, ∀m (data object, data store, message)of the process model:
IF(do||m) THEN ∃r(vr, rd, d(i||o, ac(ac), r(rd)) (vir-
tual resource, resource description) in the service template
IF(ds) THEN ∃r(pn, rd, d(i||o, ac(ac), r(rd)) (physical
node, resource description) in the service template
Phase 7 Service Model: ∀sm (service model) in the service template:∃sm(saas||paas||iaas) (SaaS or PaaS or IaaS) in the
service template
Phase 8 Development Model: ∀dm (deployment model) in the servicetemplate:
∃dm(pu||pr||co||hy) (public or private or community or
hybrid) in the service template
We define a set of semi-formal transformation rules, pre-
sented in Table V, that receive business service template
instantiations as input and generate a document describing
requirements in a cloud environment. The business services
are realised as cloud services in the cloud environment model,
where the relationships and dependencies are interconnected
throughout the three conceptual layers.
Fig. 8 illustrates an instance of the Cloud Environment
Template, generated for the Career Office system based on
the aggregation of six business service instantiations and
applying the transformation rules defined in Table V. In this
scenario we discuss the user options and how it impacts
the generated output. The user selects four capabilities to
aggregate as two separate cloud services. As the capabilities
have different service and deployment levels, the generated
cloud services are managed at different levels, depending on
their individual capabilities. For instance, C3 is IaaS and
public, while and C4 is PaaS and private, where the cloud
service itself will be split between IaaS and PaaS with the
option for selecting who manages the infrastructure resources
for the private deployment.
The application of the proposed approach on part of the
Career Office system allowed us to get some insight regarding
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TABLE V
TRANSFORMATION RULES FROM BUSINESS SERVICE INSTANCES TO THE
CLOUD ENVIRONMENT MODEL
< Pre-Conditions >
<Service Model> :
IF(SaaS) THEN ∃ Social Layer
IF(PaaS) THEN ∃ Social Layer, Application Layer
IF(IaaS) THEN ∃ Social Layer, Application Layer, Infrastructure
Layer
<Deployment Model> :
IF(Public) THEN UserInput{Infrastructure Layer, Physical Node}
IF(Private) THEN UserInput{Infrastructure Layer, Physical Node}
IF(Hybrid) THEN UserInput{Infrastructure Layer, Physical Node}
1. [All] Map each Business Service instance to a Capability (C1, . . .
, Cn(Activity Description))
2. [User] Option for selecting one or more Capabilities and aggre-
gating it into a Cloud Service instead
2.1 [Default behaviour] Maps each unassigned capability to a new
cloud service
3. [All] Map each actor to Actor list (A1, . . . , An)
4. [All] Map each Resource to VR if VR, PN if PN ignoring duplicates
(VR1, . . . , PN1, . . . , VRn, PNn)
5. [Case-by-case] Map dependency relationship from A1 of CSn to A2
with Rn, where if Input(A1 = CSP), if Output(A2 = CSP)
6. [Case-by-case] Map Security and Privacy Properties
6.1 Map security properties(Either constraints on capability or
capability implements mechanism)
6.2 Map privacy properties(Either constraints on capability or
capability implements mechanism)
7. [Case-by-case] Determine Service Model, following rules above to
indicate that CSP is responsible for the layers listed
8. [Case-by-case][User] Option for selecting the ownership of Phys-
ical Nodes on the infrastructure layer
9. [User] Option to generate visual representation of the cloud
computing environment
Social Layer
Actor: An(Actor)
<Dependency> : Dependency(A1,CSn(Cn),A2,Rn)
IF(Input) THEN A1 = CSP
IF(Output) THEN A2 = CSP
<Security and Privacy Properties>:
IF (SC || PC) THEN Constraint(Type(S || P), Description, Capability)
IF (SI || PI) THEN Mechanism(Type(S || P), Description, Capability)
Application Layer
Cloud Service:
IF(Capability = 1) THEN CSn(Capability)
IF(Capability > 1) THEN CSn(Description[User Option])
Capability:
IF(CSn(Cn(Capability), ... , Cn+1(Capability) > 1))
THEN CSn(Cn(Capability), ... , Cn+1(Capability))
Virtual Resource:
IF(Rn = VR) THEN VRn(Description, Owner: Actor[User Option])
Infrastructure Layer
Physical Node:
IF (Rn =PN) THEN PNn(Description, Managed by: Actor || Ac-
tor[User Option], Resides on: Actor || Actor[User Option])
its added value in real life scenarios. By following the defined
steps we were able to produce a set of requirements for a cloud
service which can provide to the organisation the required
functionality (i.e. conducting an online survey). The level of
granularity of the produced cloud service requirements could
facilitate the selection of an appropriate cloud service provider
by the organisation, as they are able to express their needs
in a language closer to the cloud service level. The way
such cloud service requirements were produced through our
approach, ensures their alignment with the higher levels of
Fig. 8. An instance of a Cloud Environment Model for the Career Office
system
abstraction (i.e. organisational and operational). As a result,
when a cloud service fulfilling such requirements is selected by
the organisation, it can be seamlessly integrated in its system
and provide the desired functionality while also complying
with its security and privacy needs.
V. RELATED WORK
A common approach for providing rationale for design
choices at the process level is linking them to organisational
strategy via the transformation of goal into process mod-
els [19], which is also applicable in the context of security and
privacy. For instance, the works in [19], [11], [3] incorporate
such an approach in the context of security, while the PriS
framework [10] does the same for privacy requirements. In
contrast to our approach, the focus of the analysis provided
by other works in this area is rather one-dimensional, as they
focus on either the social (e.g., interactions between actors and
resources) or the technical aspects of security (e.g., selection
of services to implement security features). Privacy is also
either considered in complete isolation from security, or as
just another security requirement. Moreover, their output lacks
flexibility as, in case the produced ad-hoc process models need
to be slightly modified, the redesign effort needs to begin from
scratch, at the goal model level.
Due to the broad range of technologies embodied through
the cloud computing paradigm, we survey work from do-
mains such as Service-Orientated Architecture, Web 2.0 and
distributed computing to provide common characteristics to-
wards a cloud environment definition [20], [5], [2]. There are
numerous efforts in producing a standard cloud computing
definition, which is critical in enabling in-depth discussions
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and reasoning around cloud characteristics and requirements.
Youseff et al. adapts an ontological approach to define cloud
computing through different stacks and layers [22]. Qian et
al. briefly talks about the categories and standardisation in
cloud computing [17]. Jadeja et al. discusses the concepts
and challenges in cloud computing [8]. Iankoulova et al.
identified nine sub-factors in cloud computing security re-
quirements, where the least researched security areas are non-
repudiation, physical protection, recovery and prosecution [7].
Zissis et al. systematically capture dynamic characteristics to
satisfy security and privacy requirements through trust-based
concepts [23]. Schmidt presents a service-oriented approach
to facilitate the management of enterprise architectures [20].
Our work addresses the need for a holistic approach to align
existing security and privacy properties through a requirements
perspective, from a business-oriented view towards concepts
on a cloud-specific domain.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work introduced a semi-automatic approach for the
derivation of cloud service requirements originating from high
level goals, focusing on security and privacy. A series of
model transformations and concept mappings between dif-
ferent modelling languages facilitated the transition between
the different levels of abstraction, in order to bridge the
gap between highly abstract organisational goals and cloud
service requirements. Despite the semi-automated nature of
the approach, user input is still required throughout its steps.
This is due to the built-in flexibility of certain aspects of
the approach, which allows the stakeholders to take informed
decisions that will shape the final output according to their
specific needs. For instance, at the process instantiation level,
a number of business process designs can be extracted from
a single hybrid reference model, depending on the selection
of security and privacy implementing mechanisms. Similarly,
during the business service instantiations stakeholders are
able to select the matching of system functionalities to cloud
services along with the service and deployment model that best
fits their needs. These options are reflected in the generation
of requirements for cloud services during the final step of the
process. There the stakeholders are presented with a holistic
view that provides a more fine-grained representation of how
their needs are realised in a cloud computing environment and
which is the impact of their choices.
Future work will focus on the creation of better defined
process patterns for each type of security and privacy require-
ment, which can be used to further automate the business
process instantiation step. Additionally, concepts from com-
monly identified domains in cloud computing literature will be
introduced, in order to demonstrate and model the impact and
propagation of cloud-specific threats and vulnerabilities based
on service model and deployment model. Finally, automated
support tools will be developed, which by executing the
defined transformation rules and receiving user input will be
able to implement each step of the proposed approach.
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